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Getting a Deal on Climate Change: 
Obama’s Flexible Multilateralism1 
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‘It will be as different as night from day’, is how Senator John Kerry described the impact of Barack Obama’s election victory on America’s stance in international climate politics. Kerry made this 
prediction in December 2008 at the fourteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-14) to the UN climate 
convention in Poznan, Poland, which he attended on behalf of the President-elect. For a short while, 
the imminent political change in the White House seemed to lift the otherwise downbeat mood 
among delegates in Poznan, and a renewed sense of optimism set in about reaching compromise 
on a new climate deal by the end of 2009, at COP-15 in Copenhagen. 
The US presidential election of 2008 is still rightly seen as a turning point in international climate policy. 
However, questions remain about the depth of America’s policy shift and its significance for international 
politics. Copenhagen proved to be the first international test for the Obama Administration’s new 
approach to climate policy, and the outcome – a non-binding political statement without numerical 
commitments for emission reductions – failed to live up to expectations. Originally billed as the most 
important factor shaping the global approach to tackling climate change, Obama’s Presidency has 
left some observers feeling underwhelmed. Yet Obama himself managed to broker a deal in the 
final hours of the doomed Copenhagen conference, and 2010 could be the make-or-break year 
for domestic climate action in America. Has Obama done enough to prepare the ground for a new 
international climate regime? 
FROM GREEN RHETORIC TO INTERNATIONAL ACTION?
Few would doubt that the US has firmly re-engaged in international climate diplomacy, and that 
this has boosted the chances of a treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol. On entering office, Obama 
reversed eight years of obstructionism under George W. Bush and committed the US to playing a 
constructive role in the international process. This alone has removed one of the most important 
obstacles to successful climate negotiations, for America, historically the world’s biggest emitter of 
greenhouse gases, possesses veto power in global climate politics which it has been willing to use. 
37
Political rhetoric and substance have then changed. At the same time, 
American diplomats remain constrained by the lack of firm domestic 
policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and particularly the 
absence of a legally binding carbon emissions trading scheme. Has the 
Obama Administration done enough to revitalise US climate policy? 
And can the US once again hope to claim a leadership role in global 
environmental politics, as it did in the 1970s and 1980s?
Questions have also been raised about America’s role in the controversial 
conclusion of the Copenhagen climate summit, which culminated in the 
Copenhagen Accord, a non-binding political agreement that was agreed 
among a small circle of heads of state and that was merely “noted” by 
the final COP-15 plenary session. Did Obama’s efforts to clinch a deal 
in Copenhagen safe the conference from collapse? Or did he betray 
the hopes of environmentalists at home and abroad by settling for the 
lowest common denominator in last-minute bargaining with a select 
group of emerging economies, most notably China? 
The answer to these questions is not straightforward. It is less about 
whether or not Obama is committed to tackling climate change – most 
indications suggest he is, as are key members of his Administration. 
Instead, the answer must address the peculiar difficulties faced by 
the Obama Administration, and indeed by any US Administration, in 
developing a proactive and convincing international climate strategy. 
The President, although in charge of foreign environmental policy, 
faces two powerful constraints at the domestic level: the political 
coalitions in Congress that determine the pace and direction of 
domestic legislation on climate change; and the efforts by interest 
groups – business and NGOs – to shape events in Congress and on 
the international scene. In other words, US climate policy flows from 
the domestic to the international, and global environmental leadership 
that is credible requires, first and foremost, strong domestic action. 
Obama’s record in international climate policy should therefore be 
judged in terms of how effectively he has navigated and shaped 
Congressional politics on this issue, and how successfully he has exploited 
the opportunities that have arisen from a resurgent environmental 
movement and shifts in business attitudes to climate action. On this, the 
Administration’s first-year record suggests some notable successes but 
also room for improvement. Obama’s climate policy got off to a flying 
start but is at risk of being bogged down in Congressional committees 
and battles with key industries. 2010 promises to be a critical year.
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CAP-AND-TRADE LEGISLATION: 
DELAYED, NOT DEFEATED
Fighting global warming and America’s reliance 
of foreign oil had been important issues on the 
campaign trail on which Obama and his rival John 
McCain were largely united. Once in office, Obama 
lost no time to announce swift and drastic action on 
both objectives. As early as January 2009, Obama 
introduced the first measures to raise fuel efficiency 
standards and reduce emissions from vehicles, in a 
clear sign of his willingness to take on the powerful 
car industry. The Administration’s first budget 
proposal in February included predictions of a $150 
billion revenue stream from a future greenhouse gas 
emissions trading scheme that would fund investment 
in clean technologies over 10 years. And in May, the 
Administration passed the first hurdle in its effort to 
introduce emissions trading, when a key House of 
Representatives committee on energy and commerce 
voted in favour of proposals for a domestic cap and 
trade bill. 
But for much of the remainder of 2009, climate 
change appeared to slip down the political agenda, 
as the financial and economic crisis, health care 
reform and military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
consumed most of the Administration’s attention. The 
Administration could take relief from the fact that 
the House of Representatives passed the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey bill) 
with a 219 to 212 majority in June. This was only 
achieved after many key elements had been watered-
down or abandoned, such as the White House’s 
proposal for a 100 percent auction of carbon permits. 
Once the Senate began considering similar legislative 
proposals, the move towards a national emissions 
trading scheme began to slow down even further. 
Two different versions of the climate bill have so far 
passed important Senate committees, most recently 
the Environment and Public Works Committee in 
November 2009. But with climate legislation still to 
be discussed in four more committees and the existing 
proposals to be amalgamated into one comprehensive 
Senate bill before reconciliation with the House 
version can begin, hopes are dwindling that a final 
bill can be passed before the Congressional elections 
in November 2010. 
Advocates of strong climate action have become 
increasingly frustrated with the President’s hands-off 
approach in the Congressional debates. As in health 
care reform, Obama pronounced broad objectives and 
principles on climate policy, but left the more detailed 
policy questions to be resolved by Congress. This has 
become a question of political style as much as of 
political prioritization. Clearly, getting health care 
agreed trumped climate change as the Democratic 
leadership’s number-one objective for 2009. And with 
many of Obama’s Democratic supporters showing 
hostility to costly climate action – 44 Democratic 
Representatives in the House voted against the cap 
and trade bill – the Obama team felt it could not 
drive the debate as forcefully as it might have wished. 
Still, in spring 2009 the Administration started to prod 
Congressmen into action by threatening to use the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s statutory powers 
to regulate carbon dioxide. This step was finally 
taken in December in the run-up to the Copenhagen 
conference, when EPA declared carbon dioxide to be 
a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. This now allows 
the Administration to impose carbon regulations on 
carbon-intensive industries even if Congress fails to 
pass a bill. As yet, Obama seems determined to give 
Congress the time it needs to find a compromise, but 
time may be running out as the mid-term elections 
in November could change the political arithmetic 
of domestic climate politics. 
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DOMESTIC INTEREST GROUPS: TWO STEPS 
FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK
Although environmental issues played a prominent role in Obama’s 
electoral campaign back in 2008, the President cannot be assured of 
broad popular support for a strong climate strategy. Over the last year, 
public opinion has shown little movement in favour of tougher action 
on greenhouse gas emissions. The economic recession and rising energy 
prices have if anything undermined popular support for climate policy. In 
contrast, the environmental movement has been revitalised by Obama’s 
victory, after eight years of marginalization during the Bush Presidency, 
and is now faced with the first tangible opportunity for national climate 
legislation since Clinton’s failed effort to introduce carbon taxation in 
1993. But the environmental camp is divided over whether to offer 
strong support to a Congressional bill that many consider not ambitious 
enough and full of concessions to industry. 
Climate security may not have captured the public’s imagination, 
but the climate legislation going through Congress has acted as a 
powerful magnet for business lobbyists. Unlike in the 1990s, when most 
business groups were opposed to domestic and international climate 
action, deep divisions are now evident within the corporate sector. The 
emergence of large and powerful coalitions of pro-regulatory business 
interests has eased the passage of the climate bill through Congress 
so far, and Obama and the Democrats on Capitol Hill have been able 
to build new coalitions with high-tech companies and the renewable 
energy sector. Major companies such as Duke Energy, General Electric, 
Alcoa, DuPont and Johnson & Johnson have publicly supported cap 
and trade legislation. And a whole new range of green energy interests 
has emerged that seeks to cash in on the market opportunities and 
subsidies potential of the Administration’s green strategy. 
Still, close links between industrial-state Democrats and traditional fossil 
fuel and manufacturing companies threaten to block further progress 
in the Senate, and the sceptical business interests have put together 
a powerful lobbying effort, with the US Chamber of Commerce and 
other groups leading a vigorous and well-funded campaign against 
cap and trade legislation. The number of lobbyists hired to work on 
climate-related legislation in Washington, DC, has shot up dramatically 
in the last few years. According to the Center for Public Integrity, 2430 
lobbyists were active on climate issues last year, more than four lobbyists 
for every member of Congress. Business groups on both sides of the 
argument will want to make sure that their interests are taken into 
account, whatever happens on the legislative front. 
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COPENHAGEN AND AFTER
With the outlook for domestic climate legislation as yet uncertain, Obama faced a serious mismatch 
between the domestic and international timetables for climate action. While the UN negotiations on 
a post-Kyoto Protocol agreement were gearing up for the critical stage in Copenhagen in December 
2009, the Administration had little choice but to offer cautious targets for emissions reductions 
that were conditional on future legislative decisions at home. The US put on the negotiation table 
a commitment to cut emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020, a figure that reflected the 
House bill and the state of debate in the Senate. This would then be an interim target on the path 
towards reaching an 80% reduction target by 2050, the target that Obama had announced earlier 
in the year. Given that the US had done little since Kyoto to reign in emissions, the proposed targets 
were disappointing if measured against the Kyoto Protocol baseline of 1990. They also fell well 
below what other leading industrialized economies were offering, but reflected both economic and 
political realities in the US. 
More importantly, the US used its international influence to gather support among other critical 
players in international climate politics, most notably China and other emerging economies with a 
growing carbon footprint. In a deliberate move to break out of the UN negotiation straightjacket 
and open up new diplomatic channels, President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton conducted 
a series of bilateral and plurilateral talks to bridge the wide gap between Northern and Southern 
perspectives on how to cut emissions. With the launch of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and 
Climate in March 2009, Obama gave an early taste of the new US strategy. This approach carried 
over into the final days of the Copenhagen conference, when heads of state were trying to agree 
a political statement that would end two weeks of slow and cumbersome UN-style negotiations. In 
the end, the Copenhagen Accord was agreed in a small setting of just five nations, involving only 
the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. The EU and Japan, stalwarts of the Kyoto Protocol 
process, were merely asked to accept the deal as a fait accompli. 
It is now apparent that what the US had started in the run-up to Copenhagen, namely to build a 
more flexible and manageable structure for negotiations between major economies and leading 
emitters, is likely to reshape climate diplomacy in the coming years. Frustrated by a formulaic and 
cumbersome UN process and left with only a non-binding Copenhagen Accord, many countries 
are now considering how to improve the negotiation format. The Obama Administration clearly 
favours a more selective core group of major emitters that can focus on the key elements of a global 
deal on emissions, as part of a more flexible multilateral setting. Obama was never likely to sign up 
to a modified version of the Kyoto Protocol, given the almost taboo nature of the ‘K’-word in US 
domestic politics. For America to re-engage, therefore, a new kind of agreement was needed that 
was built around a core deal between the US and China. 
By forcing this new approach on the rest of the world, the US and the other architects of the 
Copenhagen Accord may have broken with diplomatic protocol in climate politics. But if a new 
political structure emerges that better reflects the realities of the international system, then Obama 
would have provided a form of international leadership that few anticipated. Still, to claim the 
mantle of global climate leadership, Obama will need to deliver at the domestic level. On this, the 
jury is still out. 
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